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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from the decision of the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware denying the 
petition of Dwayne Weeks for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Weeks, who pled guilty to the first degree murder of his 
wife, Gwendolyn Weeks, and her friend, Craig Williams, was 
sentenced to death. His subsequent appeals and post- 
conviction proceedings have been unsuccessful. He raises 
one narrow issue before us: whether his trial attorney 
afforded him constitutionally ineffective assistance of 
counsel in connection with his guilty plea. 
 
Because of the nature of the proceeding, we will review 
the facts and procedural background in detail before 
turning to the legal analysis. 
 
I. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Murders of Gwendolyn Weeks and Craig Williams1 
 
At 8:36 p.m. on April 10, 1992, the 911 center of the New 
Castle County Police received a call from Gwendolyn Weeks 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The summary of facts set forth here is drawn chiefly from the District 
Court's comprehensive and uncontested statement of facts. See Weeks v. 
Snyder, No. 96-622, 1998 WL 231025 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 1998) ("Weeks 
IV"). For another summary of the murders see Weeks v. State of 
Delaware, 653 A.2d 266, 268-69 (Del. 1995) ("Weeks I"). There is no 
significant difference between them. 
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who requested that police come to her apartment 
immediately. She told the 911 operator that someone was 
trying to get into her apartment, and that she believed it 
was her estranged husband Darryl Weeks. Gwendolyn 
Weeks explained that she lived in a high-security 
apartment complex where all visitors were announced by 
the security guards and that she had not authorized any 
visitors. 
 
The 911 tapes then captured the grim events. 
Approximately four minutes after calling the 911 operator, 
Gwendolyn Weeks became alarmed and frightened, crying 
out "He's in here. He has a gun. A gun." Several gunshots 
and screams were heard over the open line and the 
operator sped the police to the caller's apartment, but they 
arrived too late to prevent the murders. Instead, the police 
officers found evidence of forced entry and the bodies of 
Gwendolyn Weeks and Craig Williams lying face down in 
the living room in a pool of blood. The police later 
determined that both Gwendolyn Weeks and Williams were 
killed while they huddled on the floor of her apartment. 
Gwendolyn Weeks was shot twice in the head. Williams 
sustained defensive gunshot wounds to his right hand and 
upper extremity, two wounds to his face, and a fatal wound 
to his head. Both victims died virtually instantaneously. 
 
B. The Case Against Weeks 
 
The police investigation of the murders focused 
immediately on Dwayne Weeks, the husband of Gwendolyn 
Weeks since 1983. The police discovered that during their 
marriage, Dwayne Weeks "subjected Gwendolyn to 
possessiveness, irresponsible behavior, and abuse." Weeks 
v. State of Delaware, 653 A.2d 266, 268 (Del. 1995) ("Weeks 
I"). In September 1991, Gwendolyn Weeks left her husband 
and moved into a high-security apartment complex 
specifically selected to protect her from her abusive 
husband. After she separated from her husband and moved 
into her own apartment, she contacted an attorney to 
discuss possible divorce proceedings. 
 
Soon after the murders a police broadcast listed Weeks 
as a suspect. That same evening, a police officer stopped a 
vehicle leaving Dwayne Weeks' residence with Weeks, his 
 
                                3 
  
girlfriend Tammy Robinson, and her daughter. Weeks was 
arrested and both Weeks and Robinson were transported to 
police headquarters. 
 
Robinson gave three statements to the police that night. 
Initially, she told the police that Weeks had been with her 
the entire day. She later told the police that Weeks had 
returned home at around 9 o'clock that evening and that 
she had seen a gun in a brown case on the kitchen table 
while she was at Weeks' house. Eventually, she confessed 
that Weeks said he was out with his friend Arthur Govan 
and told her to lie if asked about his whereabouts that 
evening. 
 
Late that evening, Govan learned that Weeks and 
Robinson had been taken into custody and that the police 
wanted to talk with him in connection with the murders. 
Govan decided to go to the police and tell his side of the 
story. The next day, after being read his Miranda warnings, 
Govan confessed that he was present during the murders 
but claimed that Weeks was the only shooter. Govan 
explained to the officers that after Weeks had received 
divorce papers earlier that week, Weeks called him and 
tried to hire him to kill his wife. Govan said he refused 
Weeks' offer but that he accompanied Weeks to his wife's 
apartment and was present during the murders. Govan 
explained that after the murders, Weeks took his wife's 
pocketbook and the two men drove to a junk yard owned by 
Weeks' father to hide the gun and the pocketbook. Weeks 
then drove Govan to the train station and returned to his 
home to pick up Robinson and her daughter. Govan 
repeated these statements to the police two days later when 
the police asked more specific questions relating to the 
number of weapons and bullets used to murder Gwendolyn 
Weeks and Williams. 
 
The police obtained a search warrant. When they 
searched Weeks' home they found a gun box for a .38 
caliber pistol on a bookshelf in Weeks' living room. The 
serial number on the gun box matched one of the murder 
weapons recovered later at his father's junk yard. 
 
The police determined that two guns were fired in 
Gwendolyn Weeks' apartment the night she and Williams 
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were murdered: a .38 caliber gun with copper jacketed 
slugs and a .32 caliber gun using lead bullets. Two 
weapons were subsequently recovered from the junk yard 
owned by Weeks' father: a .38 caliber handgun and a .32 
caliber handgun. The forensic evidence revealed that the 
.38 caliber gun was used to shoot Gwendolyn Weeks and 
fired one shot into the head of Williams. The .32 caliber 
gun was shot six times, twice into the floor and four times 
into Williams. In addition to the two weapons, the 
investigators recovered from the junk yard a partially used 
box of .38 caliber copper jacketed bullets, a make-up kit, a 
purse, a wallet, a checkbook, an address book, and various 
cards and papers. Gwendolyn Weeks' name appeared on 
the address book and the checkbook. 
 
Armed with evidence that two guns were used in the 
murders, the police arrested Govan who, after signing a 
waiver of rights form, confessed to shooting Williams. 
Weeks and Govan were jointly indicted in Delaware for, 
inter alia, two counts of first degree murder for the deaths 
of Gwendolyn Weeks and Williams. The criminal case 
against both Weeks and Govan was listed before the 
Delaware Superior Court, which is the state trial court. 
Judge John E. Babiarz presided throughout. The court 
granted the State's motion to sever the trials of the 
defendants and to schedule Weeks' trial after Govan's. 
 
Govan's trial proceeded before a jury. Despite his 
attempts to suppress his three statements to the police, the 
court admitted Govan's two earlier statements as well as 
his confession. The jury convicted Govan on all counts of 
the indictment. The jury in the penalty hearing decided that 
the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances, thereby recommending that the judge 
sentence Govan to death. The trial judge reserved making 
a decision so that he could sentence Govan and Weeks 
together. 
 
C. June 15, 1993 Chambers Conference 
 
At about 4 p.m. on June 15, 1993, attorneys for the 
State, Weeks, and Govan met with the trial judge to discuss 
a potential plea of guilty by Weeks. Counsel for Weeks, 
John Willard, was an experienced criminal defense lawyer 
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of nineteen years who had recently tried two capital murder 
cases. He was also a friend of the Weeks family. Willard 
informed the judge that over his strenuous objections 
Weeks was intent on pleading guilty to the crimes, even 
though the State persisted on pressing for the death 
penalty. 
 
        MR. WILLARD: After meeting with the State 
       yesterday, I discussed it again with my client and with 
       his parents. The parents were immediately of the 
       opinion that it was in his best interest to plead and 
       face a jury, having admitted it rather than trying it. 
 
        I spoke to him about it last night and he thought he 
       wanted to do that too. He said he wanted to have a 
       chance to talk to his parents last night. He talked to 
       them and they advised me this morning he wanted to 
       plead, and I just left him and that's what he wants to 
       do, Your Honor. I'm physically ill about it. It just-- I'm 
       a trial man and I thought we were going to try it, and 
       that's what he wants to do. I'm not terribly surprised, 
       because from the beginning he indicated that he might 
       want to do this, and I'm convinced that he's absolutely 
       competent in every way. 
 
        He is an extremely deeply religious person, and that's 
       been a big part of it. We talked about that yesterday. 
       He made me stand there and hold his hand while he 
       prayed about it, and this is what he wants to do, and 
       I've discussed every facet that I can imagine about it. 
       I discussed with him the State, Miss Epstein, 
       graciously gave me virtually everything that she was 
       going to come at him with at the penalty phase, and 
       she gave me more today and I discussed that with him. 
       He fully understands that the State intends to 
       aggressively seek the death penalty, despite his plea, 
       just as they would have if he went through trial. 
 
        I discussed with him the possible evidence we can 
       offer in mitigation, the witnesses, what they would 
       possibly testify to, and he knows what he's got for that 
       phase. 
 
App. at 8-10 (Office Conference Transcript of June 15, 
1993). 
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After discussing scheduling matters regarding the 
selection of a jury, Judge Babiarz advised counsel that if 
Weeks chose to plead guilty, he should do so the next day. 
The judge explained that he thought it would be in Weeks' 
best interest if he pled guilty before jury selection since the 
judge would be able to tell the jury that Weeks had pled 
guilty instead of first reading the full charge against him. 
The judge also stated that "[i]f Weeks changes his mind and 
backs out, then we go ahead and select the jury on guilt or 
innocence." App. at 12. 
 
The judge then turned to ascertain why Govan's attorney 
was present. Govan's attorney first requested the State not 
to seek the death penalty for Govan and to agree not to 
seek to admit any testimony to be given by Govan at Weeks' 
trial in Govan's sentencing proceeding. The State declined. 
Govan's attorney then advised the State that Govan would 
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege if called to testify at 
Weeks' trial. At this point, Willard objected: 
 
        MR. WILLARD: Your Honor, I don't mean to split 
       hairs here, but in my last capital case there was some 
       effort to call some people and the Court ruled if we 
       knew ahead of time they were going to take the Fifth, 
       we couldn't call them, or attempt to call them, and I 
       don't know if he's going to testify or not. 
 
        THE COURT: If he agrees to testify voluntarily, he 
       will testify. If he's going to assert the Fifth Amendment, 
       he will not testify unless the State persuades me that 
       privilege has been eliminated by his conviction, and I 
       won't allow the State to call him as a witness to the 
       stand to simply have him assert his Fifth Amendment. 
 
        If I rule he waived it, then I'll put him on the stand, 
       and how I force a person in that position to testify with 
       the threat of contempt, I don't know, but that's the 
       situation. I'm not going to let him go through a show 
       for the jury. If he maintains that position, I simply will 
       have to hear legal argument on whether the State can 
       call him and whether I can take any action to compel 
       him to testify or what. That's an open issue, as Miss 
       Epstein indicated on the record. 
 
App. at 17 (Office Conference Transcript of June 15, 1993). 
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The trial judge then summarized his view by stating: 
 
        [A]s far as I'm concerned, as of now, Govan is not 
       going to testify, and if the State plans to call him, they 
       either have to supply me with a document that says 
       that he will testify voluntarily, or present argument as 
       to how I could compel him to testify. 
 
App. at 18 (Office Conference Transcript of June 15). 
 
D. June 16, 1993 Plea Hearing 
 
The next morning, Weeks and his counsel appeared in 
court to enter his guilty plea. At the beginning of the plea 
hearing, Willard informed the judge that a doctor had 
briefly examined his client and found him competent to 
stand trial and to assist at trial. Willard then advised the 
court that the State had agreed to drop all other charges if 
Weeks pled guilty to murder in the first degree and felony 
murder but that the plea would not affect the State's right 
to aggressively seek the death penalty. Willard then stated: 
 
        Because of my relationship with his family, Your 
       Honor, I wanted them to know the latest events of 
       exactly what was happening. They considered what I 
       told them. They have their own ideas about the merits 
       of that plea. They advised me to speak to my client and 
       not to convey their thoughts, as they wanted this to be 
       his decision completely. 
 
        I met with my client two nights ago, Your Honor. I 
       relayed to him the State's offer and advised him in 
       great detail of the consequences of his plea. I advised 
       him there would be no trial record, for purposes of an 
       appeal. I advised him that the Supreme Court would 
       only review the penalty. I reiterated the State's position 
       regarding their seeking the death penalty. I reviewed 
       each and every factor of aggravation which the State 
       had given to me. I reviewed with him the evidence we 
       would submit. He advised me he wished to accept the 
       plea. He told me, however, that he wished to speak to 
       his parents that evening prior to formally advising me 
       of his decision. He said that he would speak with his 
       parents that night. 
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        Throughout my representations of Mr. Weeks, Your 
       Honor, he has demonstrated to me a very sincere and 
       deep religious conviction. He has repeatedly advised me 
       of his shortcomings and failures, and that he was at 
       peace with his god. He told me that he willingly 
       accepted whatever was in store for him. 
 
        Before I left him that night, he asked me to join him 
       in prayer about his decision. He prayed that God would 
       give me and his family the strength, and the Court and 
       jury to go through with this; never once voiced any 
       concern for himself, except to ask God to give him the 
       strength to continue with his convictions. 
 
        Your Honor, in my 19 years before the Bar I've never 
       known a client who was more together and content 
       with what he was doing. I advised him again that we 
       could still go to trial as we had planned and there was 
       absolutely no pressure for him to plead guilty. He told 
       me he had no interest in going to trial and he wished 
       to admit his guilt. He advised me that he was 
       completely and fully prepared to live with the 
       consequences of his plea. 
 
App. at 22-25 (Plea Hearing Transcript). 
 
Willard also gave a detailed recitation of all the advice he 
had given Weeks regarding his constitutional rights and the 
consequences of entering a guilty plea for the two capital 
offenses. He concluded by informing the court that, in his 
opinion, Weeks was entering the plea knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily. 
 
        Your Honor, I'm content that the plea is being 
       entered without improper threat or promise. I've 
       advised my client that if there has been any improper 
       threat or promise made to him that he say so now in 
       this Court. 
 
        I've advised him that if he enters this plea today, of 
       course, that there is virtually no likelihood of his ever 
       being able to withdraw that guilty plea. 
 
        Having discussed all these things in great detail, 
       Your Honor, with my client, I'm content that he's 
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       entering that plea knowingly, intelligently and 
       voluntarily. 
 
App. at 31 (Plea Hearing Transcript). 
 
Weeks was then sworn in and questioned at length by 
the trial judge. The court asked Weeks if he had listened to 
his counsel's recitation and if he had any disagreements 
with anything his counsel had told the court. The trial 
judge asked if Weeks understood that even though he pled 
guilty, the jury for the penalty phase would still learn, 
through witnesses, how the State alleges the crimes were 
committed. Weeks stated on the record that he understood 
the proceedings and the consequences of the proceedings. 
Weeks then admitted to having shot and killed Gwendolyn 
Weeks and Williams on April 10, 1992. 
 
Of critical importance on this appeal is the following 
series of questions from the judge. After Weeks admitted to 
having shot and killed the two victims, the judge advised 
Weeks regarding Govan's refusal to testify as follows: 
 
        Q: [Judge] One other matter that I meant to mention 
       to you and I'll ask you about it now. I was advised 
       yesterday that Mr. Govan may elect not to testify 
       against you; were you aware of that fact? 
 
        A: [Weeks] No, I wasn't, Your Honor. 
 
        Q: [Judge] Let me be more specific about it. I know 
       there have been discussions between Mr. Govan's 
       lawyers, one of whom is present in the courtroom right 
       now, Mr. Pankowski, and the State about whether he 
       would testify in your trial against you, either in the 
       guilt part of the trial or in the penalty part of the trial. 
       They have been talking about whether that would 
       happen. 
 
        One of Mr. Govan's lawyers was present at the 
       conference that occurred yesterday between your 
       lawyer and the State's lawyers, and I was advised then 
       and the State was advised then, that Mr. Govan would 
       assert his Fifth Amendment Right, that is, the right to 
       remain silent, if he were called as a witness in your 
       case. It's an open question as to whether I could then 
       compel him to testify or let the State use his 
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       statements against you and not decide it. There was 
       uncertainty about whether that could be used against 
       you, but as of yesterday afternoon, Mr. Govan was 
       going to stand on that Fifth Amendment Right and call 
       into question the State's ability to use any of that 
       material against you. 
 
        Now, were you aware of that? 
 
        A: [Weeks] Yes, sir. 
 
        Q: [Judge] Have you understood what I've said? If 
       you have any questions, please ask me and I'll try to 
       explain further. 
 
        A: [Weeks] No, sir. Thank you, sir, I understand. 
 
        Q: [Judge] You do understand that? 
 
        A: [Weeks] Yes. 
 
        Q: [Judge] Would that have made a difference in your 
       decision to plead guilty? If it does -- 
 
        A: [Weeks] No, sir. 
 
        THE COURT: Very well. I will accept the plea as 
       being freely, voluntarily and intelligently entered and 
       judgments of guilt are entered, and we'll proceed to 
       jury selection on the penalty phase forthwith. 
 
App. at 43-44 (Plea Hearing Transcript) (emphasis added). 
 
E. Weeks' Penalty Hearing 
 
During the penalty hearing, the State presented much of 
the same evidence it would have used had it gone to trial. 
Thirty-six witnesses testified for the State, among them 
several of Gwendolyn Weeks' and Williams' friends, 
relatives, and co-workers. The officers and detectives 
testified about the guns, bullets, and shell casings, and an 
FBI agent testified regarding the forensic evidence. An 
attorney testified that she had met with Gwendolyn Weeks 
just prior to the murders regarding a possible divorce and 
the legal implication of her husband's recent request to 
refinance their home. Robinson testified that she had seen 
a gun in a brown case on Weeks' kitchen table, and that on 
the night of the murders Weeks had left the house a little 
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after six p.m. and did not return until around nine p.m. 
She also testified that Weeks instructed her to lie to the 
police and tell them he was with her the entire evening. 
 
Most significant was the evidence of Weeks' elaborate 
plan to murder his wife provided by his accomplice Govan, 
who testified before the jury under an agreement with the 
prosecution. In exchange for Govan's testimony, the 
prosecution agreed not to use Govan's testimony against 
him in any other proceeding. The prosecution also agreed to 
recommend that the court consider Govan's testimony a 
mitigating factor in his sentencing. 
 
Govan testified that Weeks had learned that his wife was 
going to divorce him and he did not want to divide the 
property or pay her alimony, so he devised a plot to murder 
his wife: "[h]e [was] not going to let her take all he worked 
for, cars, stuff like that." App. at 189. Three days before the 
killings, Weeks tried to hire Govan to kill his wife and 
offered to pay him $500 or $250 and a gun, an offer Govan 
claimed he turned down. Weeks purportedly wanted Govan 
to murder her rather than perform the act himself, so that 
Weeks might pass a polygraph test if asked if he killed his 
wife. 
 
On the day of the murders, Weeks drove Govan to St. 
Francis Hospital, where Gwendolyn Weeks worked, so that 
Govan could case the area and familiarize himself with 
where she worked, what exit she used, and where she 
parked her car. The plan was to kill Gwendolyn Weeks after 
she left work in the parking garage where she regularly 
parked. In the early evening, Govan and Weeks hurriedly 
returned to St. Francis Hospital to catch Gwendolyn Weeks, 
who was scheduled to get off work at 8:30 p.m. After the 
two unsuccessfully searched the parking garage for her car, 
Weeks telephoned one of her co-workers at the hospital and 
learned she was not at work because she had plans that 
evening. 
 
Weeks and Govan then sped to Gwendolyn Weeks' high- 
security apartment. According to Govan, Weeks had learned 
that Williams might be with Gwendolyn Weeks that evening 
and, if so, "he going to get the same thing she get." App. at 
205. Weeks parked in a nearby church parking lot to avoid 
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detection by the apartment complex's security and 
proceeded to Gwendolyn Weeks' apartment. Weeks gave 
Govan the .32 caliber gun on the landing and told him to 
knock on the door, ask for a cup of sugar, and pretend to 
be a neighbor. 
 
When no one answered the door, Govan began to walk 
away; Weeks, however, pulled out a .38 caliber handgun, 
forced the door open, and entered the apartment with 
Govan on his heels. Govan testified that after Weeks broke 
the door down, Weeks ran straight at Gwendolyn Weeks, 
wrestled with her while she was on the phone as she tried 
desperately to move the gun away from her head, and then 
shot her twice in the head. Govan claimed that hefired two 
shots into the floor to make Weeks think he had shot 
Williams. Govan also claimed that after Weeks had killed 
Gwendolyn Weeks, Weeks turned and shot Williams several 
times in the head. When Govan was asked how six shots 
were fired out of the .32 caliber revolver, he claimed that he 
only fired two shots and then gave the revolver back to 
Weeks, who fired the remaining four shots. 
 
Hoping to conceal the nature of these murders, Weeks 
took Gwendolyn Weeks' purse so that the murders would 
look like a robbery, and the two fled the murder scene to 
the approaching sound of police sirens. Weeks drove to a 
lot owned by his father and hid the purse and murder 
weapons in one of the trucks on the lot. Weeks then 
dropped Govan off at the train station, telling him,"I got 
her like I wanted to get her. I got her good. Got both of 
them good," and returned home to his girlfriend Robinson. 
App. at 214. According to Govan, part of the master plan 
was for Robinson to provide Weeks with an alibi by 
pretending Weeks was with her in Philadelphia during the 
time of the murders. 
 
When confronted with his inconsistent statements to the 
police, Govan admitted that he lied to the police in order to 
appear more innocent. Finally, before Govan was excused, 
the court asked Govan to explain how Gwendolyn Weeks 
was found lying on top of Williams if she was shotfirst as 
he testified. Govan said he did not know but acknowledged 
that when he left the apartment that night, Gwendolyn 
Weeks was lying on top of Williams. 
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At the conclusion of Weeks' penalty hearing, the jury 
deliberated for two days before finding that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances on 
each count. On September 7, 1993, the trial judge 
sentenced Weeks to death and Govan to consecutive life 
terms. 
 
F. Weeks' Delaware Post-Conviction Proceedings 
 
Weeks exhausted his direct appeal to the Delaware 
Supreme Court, which rejected all Weeks' claims of error 
and affirmed. See Weeks I, 653 A.2d at 275. Thereafter, 
Weeks filed a motion for state post-conviction relief. The 
petition claimed that Weeks received ineffective assistance 
of counsel from his trial counsel because: 
 
       (1) Weeks' attorney did not advise him [prior to his 
       guilty plea] that Govan would refuse to testify 
       against him in the trial; 
 
       (2) Weeks' attorney did not advise him that if Govan 
       persisted in his refusal to testify, then Govan's 
       out-of-court statement to the police would not be 
       admissible in Weeks' trial, thereby substantially 
       weakening the State's case against Weeks; [and] 
 
       (3) Weeks' attorney failed to tell Weeks that the State 
       would present the very same evidence concerning 
       the circumstances and details of the crime in the 
       penalty hearing that would have been presented if 
       Weeks had elected to go to trial on the issue of 
       guilt. 
 
App. at 420 (Motion for Post-Conviction Relief). 
 
Weeks' petition conceded that "Weeks told Willard that he 
was in favor of entering a guilty plea because he believed 
that such a plea would somehow spare the victims' family 
and his family from the additional trauma of having all of 
the details and circumstances of the crimes brought out in 
court." App. at 419 (Motion for Post-Conviction Relief). 
 
Judge Babiarz, the same judge who presided over the 
guilty plea hearing and sentencing, held an evidentiary 
hearing on September 8, 1995 at which both Weeks and his 
counsel testified and presented starkly conflicting 
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testimony. Willard declared that from the day of Weeks' 
arrest, Weeks immediately began talking about accepting 
responsibility for the killings by pleading guilty. As Willard 
testified: 
 
        My very first meeting with Dwayne, he made it very, 
       very clear to me that he had a very close, warm, 
       personal relationship with Jesus Christ, his savior and 
       Lord, and throughout every conversation, that came up 
       and was part of everything. 
 
        And in fact, virtually every time I met with Dwayne 
       he would ask that we pray together. He would take my 
       hands in his and we'd sit there and we'd pray. 
 
        Now, while I may not have a reputation for that, I 
       happen to be a very deeply religious man in my own 
       way, and I was very touched by that, and we were very 
       close and very open from the very, very first meeting. 
 
        He is the one who began immediately talking about 
       a plea. 
 
App. at 443-42 (Post-Conviction Hearing Transcript). 
 
        [F]rom our first meeting and virtually every meeting 
       thereafter he would say to me, "Mr. Willard, I did it" 
       and say things like, "We don't have to do this, we don't 
       have to go to trial, I did it." 
 
App. at 455 (Post-Conviction Hearing Transcript). 
 
When asked how he responded when Weeks immediately 
revealed his desire to plead guilty, Willard testified that at 
that time he knew nothing about the case and kept 
reminding Weeks "we don't make any decisions yet. There's 
a whole lot of things we've got to go through first, 
preliminary hearings and discovery and so forth before I 
can have any idea of where we are in this matter." App. at 
444-45 (Post-Conviction Hearing Transcript). Willard stated 
that from the beginning he had an overwhelming desire to 
go all the way and try this case to the best of his ability. 
 
Willard further testified that as the trial approached, he 
continued to counsel Weeks against pleading guilty so long 
as the State continued to seek the death penalty. It was his 
position that if there was any possibility of a deal, part of 
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the deal must include the State not pursuing the death 
penalty. When the State offered to drop the miscellaneous 
charges if Weeks pled guilty to first degree murder, he "felt 
compelled then to at least formally broach that with[his] 
client" but that "[i]t was basically nothing. It was not an 
offer. It was plead guilty and they would still go for the 
death penalty and they still intended to put on a full show 
for the penalty phase hearing." App. at 452 (Post-Conviction 
Hearing Transcript). Willard testified that he"tried to 
explain to [Weeks] that to [him] . . . pleading guilty was a 
worthless thing to do." App. at 456 (Post-Conviction 
Hearing Transcript). 
 
But the testimony of both Weeks and his own counsel is 
in agreement that Weeks was determined to confess his 
guilt due to his religious convictions and his desire to avoid 
inflicting further pain on the victims' families and his own. 
According to Willard's testimony, Weeks never once said 
"let's have a trial on this" or indicated a desire to make the 
State prove its case. To the contrary, Willard stated "I'm the 
one who kept talking about a trial, trial, trial and he never 
said anything. He just would say, `Well, I did it' and so 
forth." App. at 490 (Post-Conviction Hearing Transcript). 
 
When asked if he informed Weeks that Govan may not 
testify, Willard stated that following the conference with the 
judge, he immediately returned to Weeks and discussed at 
great length the fact that Govan might not testify and that 
this would seriously weaken the State's case. Willard also 
testified that although he was hopeful that Govan would 
not testify, he was not optimistic since Govan remained 
eager to avoid the death penalty by cutting a deal with the 
State. 
 
        [Willard] I thought that [Govan would not testify] was 
       an outside possibility, and again my initial impression 
       was like this. Govan has been tried, convicted and he's 
       been through a penalty phase. He knows the jury's 
       verdict, vote. 
 
        I would imagine that there's a whole lot of defendants 
       out there who may be a little tougher or more 
       sophisticated than Mr. Govan who would say, "I've got 
       absolutely nothing in the world to gain by helping the 
       State and they can go to hell . . . ." 
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        I quite frankly hoped in my heart that that might 
       happen. Yet I could tell from the way Eddie [Govan's 
       attorney] was playing it and the way the State was that 
       there was something going on that might change that 
       and make him want to testify. 
 
App. at 465 (Post-Conviction Hearing Transcript). 
 
Weeks' testimony in the post-conviction hearing differed 
markedly from Willard's on many significant facts. Weeks 
testified that he initially considered pleading guilty only if 
he could avoid the death penalty, App. at 492; that Willard 
failed to advise him that pleading guilty would not spare 
the victims' families the trauma of a trial, App. at 502; and 
that Willard never told him that Govan was threatening not 
to testify, App. at 508, or that if Govan refused to testify 
Govan's out-of-court statements could not be used against 
him, App. at 510. Weeks admitted that he knew that 
Govan's testimony would "hurt me bad," App. at 509, that 
Willard met with him the evening before he pled guilty (the 
evening following the conference with the judge where 
Willard was informed that Govan might not testify), App. at 
523, and that he repeatedly told his attorney that he 
wanted to plead guilty to spare the victims' families and his 
own, App. at 497, 512-13. 
 
Weeks was then presented with his statements at the 
time of his guilty plea when the trial judge questioned him 
regarding his understanding that Govan would not testify 
and its implications. Weeks was asked to re-read the 
portion of the transcript where the trial judge informed him 
that Govan was threatening not to testify and that it was an 
open question whether Govan could be forced to testify or 
whether his out-of-court statement could be used against 
Weeks. Weeks was asked to explain why he told the judge 
that it would not make a difference in his decision to plead 
guilty if Govan refused to testify against him. Weeks stated 
that he understood what the judge was saying, but 
explained as follows: 
 
        Q: You answered `No, Sir.' You said it wouldn't make 
       a difference. Why did you say that? 
 
        A: [Weeks] Well, one, because of my understanding 
       that I had concerning the families and them not being 
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       brought back into this thing, you know, of a fullness, 
       not re-living this thing over again. 
 
        That weighed heavy on my heart and I didn't want to 
       bring them back through that. This is what I shared 
       with Mr. Willard on a number of occasions coming up 
       into that. That's mainly why I didn't change my plea. 
 
App. at 512-13 (Post-Conviction Hearing Transcript). 
 
In concluding his testimony, Weeks asserted that if 
Willard had informed him of the legal ramifications of 
Govan's refusal to testify, he would not have pled guilty. 
 
        Q: Now, if anyone had explained to you the legal 
       ramifications of Arthur Govan not testifying, and if, in 
       addition to that, you knew that you weren't going to 
       spare anybody anything by pleading guilty, would you 
       have pled guilty? 
 
        A: [Weeks] No. We'd have went to trial. 
 
App. at 515 (Post-Conviction Hearing Transcript). 
 
As the testimony by Weeks conflicted sharply with that of 
his counsel, Judge Babiarz stated in his written opinion 
denying post conviction relief that the resolution of Weeks' 
claims "rests primarily on [the] credibility" of Weeks and his 
counsel. State of Delaware v. Weeks, No. 92010167DI, slip 
op. at 2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1995) ("Weeks II"). The 
court re-characterized Weeks' claims as raising two 
instances of ineffective assistance of counsel: 
 
       (1) that Weeks' trial counsel failed to inform Weeks, 
       prior to the entry of his guilty plea, that Govan might 
       refuse to testify at Weeks' trial, and 
 
       (2) that Weeks' trial counsel failed to inform Weeks that 
       even if he pled guilty to the murder charges, the State 
       would present the same evidence in the Penalty 
       Hearing concerning the circumstances of the killings 
       that they would have presented at trial. 
 
Id. 
 
After reviewing the transcripts of the office conference, 
Weeks' plea colloquy, and the testimony from the 
evidentiary hearing, the court adopted Willard's version of 
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the events leading up to the guilty plea. With respect to 
Weeks' first claim of ineffectiveness, the court specifically 
found that Weeks "was informed of Govan's indecision" 
about whether to testify. Id. at 3. With respect to the 
second claim, the court concluded that Weeks was aware 
that the State would offer evidence of the circumstances of 
the crime at the penalty hearing. The court therefore 
dismissed Weeks' claims as unsubstantiated, a decision the 
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed in a brief opinion, see 
Weeks v. State of Delaware, 683 A.2d 60, 1996 WL 470717 
(Del. 1996) (table) ("Weeks III"), and Weeks was scheduled 
for execution. 
 
G. Weeks' Federal Habeas Petition  
 
On December 20, 1996, Weeks filed this habeas petition 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254, reasserting his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Weeks' petition 
was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996), the provisions of that Act are 
applicable. Weeks argued that his legal representation was 
deficient because Willard failed to research the legal 
implications of Govan's refusal to testify and failed to 
inform Weeks of the legal ramifications of that refusal. The 
District Court determined that this issue was presented in 
the state post-conviction appeal process and thus satisfied 
AEDPA's exhaustion requirement. Weeks v. Snyder , No. 96- 
622, 1998 WL 231025, slip op. at 44-45 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 
1998) ("Weeks IV"). 
 
Turning to the merits of the claim, the District Court 
concluded that Willard's legal representation did not fall 
below the acceptable level required by the Sixth 
Amendment as his failure to research this issue was 
excused once he realized that the strength of the State's 
case was not a factor in Weeks' decision to plead guilty. Id. 
at 51. The District Court also concluded that Weeks failed 
to demonstrate prejudice because the court was convinced 
from evidence in the record that Weeks would have pled 
guilty even if Willard had informed Weeks that Govan's out- 
of-court statements might be inadmissible at trial. Id. at 64. 
Although the District Court denied Weeks' petition, it 
certified the ineffective assistance claim for appeal and 
 
                                19 
  
granted a stay of execution pending appeal. Id.  at 65. 
Weeks filed a timely appeal to this court. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and 2253. 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. Applicable Legal Principles 
 
Weeks' only claim before us is based on his contention 
that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel, an element of a defendant's 
fundamental right to a fair trial. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 
120 S. Ct. 1029, 1034 (2000); Nix v. Whiteside , 475 U.S. 
157, 175 (1986); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
686 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's 
representations were objectively deficient and, with a few 
notable exceptions, that prejudice resulted from these 
alleged deficiencies. See Flores-Ortega, 120 S. Ct. at 1037; 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 691-694; Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133-134 (3d Cir. 
1984). A lawyer's representation is considered objectively 
deficient if it "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To establish 
prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate that there is a 
"reasonable probability that but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Id. at 694. 
 
"In most cases, a defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel involves counsel's performance during 
the course of a legal proceeding, either at trial or on 
appeal." Flores-Ortega, 120 S. Ct. at 1037. However, the 
principles apply equally to those defendants who have pled 
guilty. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Supreme 
Court applied the Strickland two-part test for determining 
ineffective assistance of counsel in a case where the 
defendant challenged a guilty plea. Although the standard 
for deficient performance remains unchanged, in a guilty 
plea case the standard for prejudice "focuses on whether 
counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected 
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the outcome of the plea process." Id. at 59; see United 
States v. Nahodil, 36 F.3d 323, 326-327 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F.2d 885, 889 (3d Cir. 1987). In 
order for a defendant such as Weeks who challenges his 
guilty plea to satisfy the prejudice requirement, he must 
demonstrate that there is a "reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 
59. "As with all applications of the Strickland test, the 
question whether a given defendant has made the requisite 
showing will turn on the facts of a particular case." Flores- 
Ortega, 120 S. Ct. at 1039. 
 
B. Deficient Performance 
 
Weeks argues that Willard's representation was deficient 
because Willard failed to inform him fully of the legal 
implications of Govan's refusal to testify. In so doing, 
Weeks does not contest on appeal the express factual 
finding by the Delaware court that Willard alerted Weeks 
that Govan was refusing to testify. Rather, Weeks contends 
that if Willard had researched the legal issues, he would 
have learned that there was nothing that the State or the 
trial court could have done to compel Govan to testify and, 
more importantly, that if Govan refused to testify the State 
could not admit his out-of-court statements against Weeks 
under Delaware's rules of evidence. His position, succinctly 
stated, is: "Weeks did not receive critical legal advice that 
was essential to making an informed and conscious 
decision whether to plead guilty or go to trial[;] [s]imply 
being told that Govan would not testify was not enough." 
Appellant's Br. at 24. 
 
AEDPA provides that factual determinations made by a 
state court are presumed correct and that the petitioner 
has the burden to rebut the presumption by clear and 
convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(1). Weeks 
argues that the Delaware court failed to make a factual 
determination necessary to his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel when it rejected his Sixth Amendment 
claim as "unsubstantiated." The District Court agreed with 
Weeks that the Delaware court failed to make such a 
finding. See Weeks IV, 1998 WL 231025, at *22. 
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Although the Delaware court made no express finding in 
its post-conviction opinion as to whether Willard advised 
Weeks of the legal ramifications of Govan's refusal to 
testify, we believe the District Court gave a far too narrow 
interpretation to the Delaware court's findings, and thereby 
violated the principles of comity and the "high measure of 
deference to the factfindings made by the state courts" 
required by S 2254(e) and S 2254(d) (pre-AEDPA). Sumner v. 
Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 598 (1982); see also Miller v. Fenton, 
474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985) (federal habeas courts must"give 
great weight to the considered conclusions of coequal state 
judiciary"). The federal habeas statute provides us "no 
license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose 
demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but 
not by [us]." Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 
(1983). "Thus, the factual conclusions which the federal 
habeas courts [are] bound to respect in assessing 
respondent's constitutional claims [are] . . . the finding[s] of 
the [State] trial court . . . and the inferences fairly deducible 
from those facts." Id. at 435 (emphasis added). 
 
The Supreme Court has instructed that in habeas 
proceedings, "if no express findings of fact have been made 
by the state court, the District Court must initially 
determine whether the state court has impliedly found 
material facts." Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 314 
(1963). The Court suggested that if the state court rejected 
the petitioner's claim on the merits in a prior state 
collateral proceeding "but made no express findings, it may 
still be possible for the District Court to reconstruct the 
findings of the state trier of fact, either because his view of 
the facts is plain from his opinion or because of other 
indicia." Id. The Court continued, "the coequal 
responsibilities of state and federal judges in the 
administration of federal constitutional law are such that 
we think the district judge may, in the ordinary case in 
which there has been no articulation, properly assume that 
the state trier of fact . . . found the facts against the 
petitioner." Id. at 314-15. See also LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 
410 U.S. 690, 692 (1973) (per curiam) (providing 
presumption of correctness required by 28 U.S.C.S 2254(d) 
to implicit findings of a state court). 
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Following this precedent, this court recently held that we 
must provide the same presumption of correctness required 
by S 2254(e)(1) to the state courts' implicit factual findings 
as we provide to express findings of the state courts. See 
Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 285-86 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Accord Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 183 (5th Cir. 
1998); Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 1996); 
Ventura v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 1048, 1055 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1990); Crespo 
v. Armontrout, 818 F.2d 684, 686 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 
One of the three grounds Weeks asserted in his state 
post-conviction proceeding in support of his contention that 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated was 
that "Weeks' attorney did not advise him that if Govan 
persisted in his refusal to testify, then Govan's out-of-court 
statement to the police would not be admissible in Weeks' 
trial, thereby substantially weakening the State's case 
against Weeks." App. at 420 (Motion for Post-Conviction 
Relief). At the evidentiary hearing, Willard testified that he 
not only advised Weeks that Govan was threatening to 
refuse to testify, see App. at 466, but also that without 
Govan's testimony the State's case was much weaker, see 
App. at 470. He testified that he discussed the situation 
thoroughly with Weeks and that he specifically spoke with 
Weeks of the legal technicalities if Govan refused to testify, 
see App. at 477-78, and told Weeks that he would not 
spare the victims' families by pleading guilty because the 
State would present the same evidence at trial, see App. at 
459. 
 
In contrast, Weeks testified at the same hearing that 
Willard never told him that Govan was refusing to testify or 
the legal implications on the admissibility of Govan's out-of- 
court statements, see App. at 504, and said that Willard 
never told him that he would not spare his or the victims' 
families any trauma by pleading guilty, see App. at 502. 
Other conflicts between Willard and Weeks permeate their 
respective testimonies. For example, Willard testified that 
Weeks continuously rejected his advice that Weeks not 
plead guilty unless the State agreed not to pursue the 
death penalty, see App. at 449-50, while Weeks testified 
that it was his position from the beginning that any guilty 
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plea include such an agreement from the State, see App. at 
492. 
 
After hearing the testimony of both Weeks and Willard, 
the Delaware Superior Court stated that "[s]ince Willard 
and Weeks are in direct contradiction as to what was said 
between them, the resolution of the disagreement rests 
primarily on credibility." Weeks II, slip op. at 2. The court, 
weighing the credibility of the two witnesses, adopted 
Willard's version of the events leading up to the guilty plea. 
The court stated that "Willard testified that he informed 
Weeks about the possibility that Govan may not testify" and 
it found, based on this testimony and the plea colloquy, 
that "Weeks was informed of Govan's indecision" and "knew 
that similar evidence would be presented at the penalty 
hearing regardless of his guilty plea." Id.  at 3, 4 (emphasis 
added). 
 
Although the court never expressly rejected Weeks' 
contention that Willard failed to inform him about the effect 
of Govan's refusal to testify, it did find that the factual 
bases for Weeks' claims of ineffectiveness on the part of 
counsel were "unsubstantiated." Id. at 4. It is significant 
that the state post-conviction judge was the same judge 
who presided over the guilty plea hearing and the 
sentencing. After reviewing the Superior Court's ruling on 
Weeks' post-conviction motion, the Supreme Court of 
Delaware affirmed, stating that "[t]he Superior Court, in its 
decision denying the Rule 61 motion, carefully considered 
all of Weeks' arguments." See Weeks III, 683 A.2d 60, 1996 
WL 47017. 
 
It is reasonable to draw from this record the inference 
that the judge who heard the evidence determined that 
Willard's testimony on this issue was more credible than 
Weeks', as that judge had credited Willard on every other 
factual dispute that he expressly reached. We therefore 
conclude that the Delaware court made the implicitfinding 
that Willard advised Weeks of the implications of Govan's 
failure to testify, a finding entitled to deference. As noted 
above, this implicit factual finding is due the same highly 
differential presumption of correctness required by 
S 2254(e), which Weeks has failed to defeat by clear and 
convincing evidence. It follows that Weeks failed to show 
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that Willard's legal performance was objectively deficient, 
the first prong of a showing of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution, we will 
consider as well the prejudice prong. 
 
C. Prejudice 
 
As Justice O'Connor emphasized in Flores-Ortega , "[t]he 
second part of the Strickland test requires the defendant to 
show prejudice from counsel's deficient performance." 120 
S. Ct. at 1037. Thus, even if Weeks established that his 
counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable, he 
must also demonstrate that "there is reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 
U.S. at 59. The Court in Hill stated that the prejudice 
inquiry in many guilty plea cases "will closely resemble the 
inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective- 
assistance challenges to convictions obtained through trial." 
Id. Thus, as the Supreme Court explained in Strickland, "[a] 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." 466 U.S. at 694. 
 
In order to examine the prejudice issue, we mustfirst 
determine what Willard would have learned had he 
researched the effect of Govan's refusal to testify. We must 
then determine whether there is a reasonable probability 
that if Weeks had been informed of the results of this 
research, he would have insisted on going to trial. 
 
In this connection, it is important to recall that Govan 
had given three inculpatory statements shortly after the 
murders, each of which placed the principal responsibility 
on Weeks but which also implicated Govan to differing 
extents. Weeks contends that under the applicable 
Delaware rule of evidence, the prosecutor cannot use the 
prior statements of an accomplice as affirmative evidence if 
s/he refuses to testify. See 11 Del. C.S 3507.2 As stated by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 3507 of the Delaware Code provides: 
 
        (a) In a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior 
       statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross- 
       examination may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive 
       independent testimonial value. 
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Weeks, "if Govan had refused to testify and therefore could 
not be cross-examined, his out-of-court statements 
inculpating Weeks would have been inadmissible against 
Weeks." Appellant's Br. at 22-23. The parties agree that 
there was no effective way to compel Govan to testify if he 
was unwilling, as effective sanctions would be unavailable 
inasmuch as Govan was already facing at least a life 
sentence. Although the parties disagree as to whether 
Govan's prior statements would have been admissible even 
if he chose not to testify, this appeal does not turn on that 
issue.3 
 
Weeks' point is that Willard failed to tell him that they 
may not have been admissible. However, even if Willard did 
not tell him, he could not have been prejudiced because the 
trial judge told him. During Weeks' guilty plea colloquy, 
which took place while the parties were aware of Govan's 
equivocation about testifying, Judge Babiarz stated to 
Weeks in open court that it was an "open question" whether 
Govan's prior statements would have been admissible. The 
court stated: 
 
       It's an open question as to whether I could then compel 
       him [Govan] to testify or let the State use his 
       statements against you and not decide it. There was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        (b) The rule in subsection (a) of this section shall apply 
regardless 
       of whether the witness' in-court testimony is consistent with the 
       prior statement or not. The rule shall likewise apply with or 
without 
       a showing of surprise by the introducing party. 
 
        (c) This section shall not be construed to affect the rules 
       concerning the admission of statements of defendants or of those 
       who are codefendants in the same trial. This section shall also not 
       apply to the statements of those whom to cross-examine would be 
       to subject to possible self-incrimination. 
 
11 Del. C. S 3507. 
 
3. Compare Keys v. State, 337 A.2d 18 (Del. 1975) (holding that out-of- 
court statement by accomplice (who was not a codefendant) 
inadmissible) with State v. Miller, 1991 WL 166436 (Del. Super. 1991) 
(raising possibility of admissibility under traditional hearsay exception 
if 
confrontation clause satisfied) and Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (same). 
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       uncertainty about whether that could be used against 
       you, but as of yesterday afternoon, Mr. Govan was 
       going to stand on that Fifth Amendment Right and call 
       into question the State's ability to use any of that 
       material against you. 
 
App. at 43-44 (Plea Hearing Transcript). This summary by 
the judge was an accurate and simple synopsis of the legal 
ramifications of Govan's refusal to testify. See supra note 3. 
When the judge asked Weeks, "If you have any questions, 
please ask me and I'll try to explain further," Weeks 
responded "No, sir. Thank you, sir. I understand." App. at 
44. (emphasis added). The judge then asked Weeks if this 
information would have made a difference in his decision to 
plead guilty, to which Weeks responded, "No Sir." App. at 
44. 
 
This colloquy beli 
